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Carter v. Lee
No. 99-10, 1999 WL 1267353
(4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1999)1
I. Facts
On December 18, 1989, a sanitation worker discovered the body of
Amelia Lewis ("Lewis") in an alley in Goldsboro, North Carolina.2 An
autopsy showed that Lewis's death resulted from blunt force trauma to the
head and manual strangulation. In addition, her body had numerous abra-
sions and post-mortem wounds.' When Lewis's body was discovered, her
left pants leg was removed and her underwear pulled down. Captain C. E.
Boltinhouse ("Botinhouse"), of the Goldsboro Police Department, noted
the similarity of this condition to the description of another rape that
occurred an hour after the police received a call reporting screams in the
area where Lewis's body was found.4 That call was received the evening on
which police estimate that Lewis was murdered.'
After making this connection, Botinhouse went to the home of Marcus
Louis Carter ("Carter") to arrest him for the rape.6 Forensic evidence
recovered during a search of Carter's home in connection with the rape
investigation tied him to Lewis's murder.' Carter was charged with first
1. This is an unpublished opinion referenced in the "Table of Decisions Without
Reported Opinions" at 202 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. Carter v. Lee, No. 99-10, 1999 WL 1267353, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1999). Three
days prior to the discovery of Lewis's body, police responded to a report of a woman
screaming "please don't kill me." The reporting officer saw and heard nothing in the area.
Id.
3. Id. The post-mortem wounds included a tear in Lewis's liver, which would have
been fatal if Lewis were not already dead. Id.
4. Id. The rape of Kesha Davis occurred one block from the location where Lewis's
body was found. Davis told police that her assailant (later identified as Marcus Carter)
removed the left leg of her pants and pulled her underwear down. Id.
5. See supra note 2; Carter, 1999 WL 1267353, at *1.
6. Carter, 1999 WL 1267353, at *1. Carter resided at his mother's home. His mother
was at home when Boltinhouse arrived and consented to a search of the home. During the
search, Boltinhouse found articles of clothing that matched the description of the clothing
worn by Davis's attacker. Carter was, subsequently arrested and pleaded guilty to the rape
of Kesha Davis. Id.
7. Id. Specifically, fingernail scrapings from Lewis and samples from Carter's sweat-
shirt indicated that some particles (nail polish) originated from the same source, blood
spattered on Carter's jeans and sweatshirt matched Lewis's blood, but not his own, and fibers
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degree murder, first degree kidnaping, and attempted second degree rape.8
Carter denied guilt at trial, and the proceeding ended in a hung jury as to the
murder and attempted rape charges.9
Prior to jury selection for the retrial, Carter told the court that he
wanted new counsel." He further informed the court that if new counsel
were not appointed he would represent himself." The court refused to
appoint new counsel and allowed Carter to proceed pro se. 2 His counsel
were appointed standby counsel during the retrial. 3 At the close of the guilt
phase of the trial, the jury convicted Carter of both charges. 4 Thereafter,
Carter accepted assistance of counsel for the sentencing phase."
During the sentencing phase of the trial, two witnesses testified for the
case in mitigation: a psychologist and Carter's mother. The prosecution
cross-examined the psychologist, Dr. Borgman ("Borgman"), about a state-
ment in his report concerning Carter's level of intoxication." Specifically,
Borgman's report stated that Carter was so intoxicated that he could not
have engaged in vaginal intercourse on the night of Lewis's murder. The
prosecutor pointed out that Carter had pleaded guilty to the rape of Davis
on that night, thereby forcing Borgman to modify his opinion while on the
stand.'" Furthermore, during cross-examination, Carter's mother conceded
that although he had periods of good behavior and frequently vowed to
change his ways, he always reverted to his negative behaviors. 8
consistent with his sweatshirt were found under Lewis's fingernails. Id.
8. Id., at *2. The North Carolina definition of first-degree murder is equivalent to the
definition of capital murder in Virginia and is punishable by death. See N.C. GEN. STAT. S
14-17 (1999).
9. Id. Eleven jurors voted to convict Carter and one voted to acquit him. Id. The trial
court directed a verdict for Carter on the kidnaping charge. Id. at n.4.
10. Id., at *2.
11. Id. The trial judge engaged Carter in a lengthy colloquy about his desire to
represent himself before allowing him to proceed. Id., at *7 & n.9.
12. Id., at *2.
13. Id.
14. Id. Carter's only witness during the guilt phase of the trial was a DNA expert who
testified that she was unable to develop or obtain DNA profiles because the materials she
received were insufficient. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Borgman stated that in his modified opinion, Carter was not capable of
engaging in intercourse twice that night. Id.
18. Id. Carter's mother, Shirley Hill ("Hill"), testified that she believed his problems
were caused by drug and alcohol abuse. She also testified that Carter was dassified as a
"Willie M." child during his youth. Borgman described that dassification as applicable to
people who "engage in extremely violent behavior both towards persons and property as a
result of a neurological impairment or severe emotional disturbance." Id.
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The State put on evidence of Carter's criminal record, evidence of
abuse of his former and current girlfriends, and evidence of disobedience
during a prior incarceration.19 The jury recommended a death sentence after
finding only one mitigating factor: that Carter admitted prior criminal
offenses. The court imposed the death sentence."0 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina affirmed the conviction and death sentence.21 The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.22
In subsequent state proceedings on a motion for appropriate relief
("MAR'), 3 the court denied relief without a hearing and held that all of
Carter's claims were either barred, defaulted, or without merit.2 4 Carter
then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The
court denied relief without a hearing.
25
On petition for a certificate of appealability to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Carter asserted the following claims: (1)
the state MAR court did not "adjudicate" his claim within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. S 2254(d);26 (2) the trial court erred in failing to appoint new
counsel for the retrial ;2 (3) the trial court did not adequately inquire into
whether Carter's decision to represent himself was knowing and
voluntary;2 (4) a jury instruction given at trial violated his rights under the
19. Id., at *3. In addition to the rape of Davis, Carter previously pleaded guilty to
felonious larceny and possession of marijuana. Id.
20. Id. The jury rejected fifteen other statutory and non-statutory mitigating factors.
Id.
21. See State v. Carter, 451 S.E.2d 157 (N.C. 1994).
22. See Carter v. North Carolina, 515 U.S. 1107 (1995).
23. In North Carolina, MAR is the name given to state habeas proceedings.
24. Carter, 1999 WL 1267353, at *3. The Supreme Court of North Carolina denied
certiorari. See State v. Caner, 510 S.E.2d 658 (N.C. 1998).
25. Carter, 1999 WL 1267353, at *3.
26. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. Title 153, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Section 2254(b) bars
consideration of federal habeas claims if the petitioner has not exhausted state court remedies.
27. Carter, 1999 WL 1267353, at *5. This claim is not discussed in detail in this case
note because the court dismissed it in summary fashion. Carter's claim centered around his
allegation that his counsel were constitutionally ineffective in their preparation for the first
and second trials. The court stated: "Assuming that lack of preparation amounting to
constitutionally ineffective assistance can constitute cause for the appointment of new
counsel, Carter cannot demonstrate that counsel's preparation was constitutionally deficient."
Id. The court reiterated that the standard by which counsel may be judged constitutionally
ineffective is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to establish
ineffectiveness, petitioner must show that counsel's performance "fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court concluded that Carter
was not able to meet this standard because his counsel's actions (failure to hire an investiga-
tor, failure to retain an expert to analyze the evidence, and failure to communicate between
the trials) were not objectively unreasonable. Carter, 1999 WI. 1267353, at *6.
28. Carter, 1999 WL 1267353, at *7.
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Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution;29 (5) his attorneys
were constitutionally ineffective during the sentencing phase of the trial;3"
and (6) he was prejudiced by several instances of prosecutorial misconduct
as well as improper comments and instructions by the trial court. 1
I1 Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, holding
that Carter failed to make the "substantial showing of the denial of a consti-
tutional right" required for a certificate of appealability to issue, denied his
application and dismissed his appeal.32
I. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. What it Means to be "Adjudicated on the Merits'for Purposes ofAEDPA
Carter argued that his MAR claims were not adjudicated under the
terms of 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d), as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), because the state court gave
only one hour of consideration to his two-hundred page motion. 3 Under
this statute, federal courts are prohibited from granting habeas relief on "any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim... resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
29. Id., at *8. Caner's Eighth Amendment claim is not discussed in detail because it
is grounded upon a challenge to a North Carolina jury instruction, based upon North
Carolina law.
30. Id., at *9.
31. Id., at *10.
32. Id., at *1.
33. Id., at *3. The court reviewed the papers from the bench, without adjourning.
After one hour, the court stated that it had read the materials "in detail" and would deny the
MAR. Id. The MAR itself was sixty-three pages, with 142 pages of attachments and the
State's response was forty-three pages, with fifty-six pages of attachments. Id., at *4 & n.5.
Another area of concern is that Carter's MAR counsel announced to the court that they
"had never done one of these before" and "basically what we're here to do today is just
introduce ourselves, and maybe get some guidance from the Court of what we could expect."
Id., at *3. State habeas proceedings are obviously a critical stage in post conviction proceed-
ings as many claims are forfeited or lost at that level. It is imperative for counsel to be fully
prepared before this stage. See DONALD E. WILKES, STATE POST CONVICTION REMEDIES
AND RELIEF, WITH FORMS (1996); see also David D. Leshner, Attempting to Level the Playing
Fiel" Obtaining Resources in State and Federal Habeas, 11 CAP. DEF.J. 21(1998). In addition,
many jurisdictions have resource centers which can educate attorneys. The Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse does not accept new cases at the habeas level; however the Virginia
Capital Representation Resource Center is one resource available for habeas cases (phone #
804-643-6845). VCRRC accepts appointments and offers consulting services for attorneys
appointed counsel in state or federal habeas cases.
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as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."'34 Carter's claim
raised an issue of first impression for the court: whether the decision of a
state court can be considered an "adjudication" if the court did not spend an
adequate amount of time reviewing the petitioner's claims.
In its analysis of this issue, the court relied upon the reasoning set forth
in Cardwell v. Greene.3" In Cardwell, the Fourth Circuit determined that the
"state court 'unquestionably' adjudicated the petitioner's claims even though
its order neither set forth factual findings nor offered the reasoning behind
its decision."36 In that case, Cardwell argued that a claim could not be
adjudicated on the merits unless "the state court has afforded the petitioner
an opportunity to develop the factual basis of his claim and has set forth
findings of fact and conclusions of law in its disposition of the claim."3"
However, the Fourth Circuit held that the brief statement by the Supreme
Court of Virginia constituted a decision on the merits. 8 The court reasoned
that the Supreme Court of Virginia was briefed by both parties and thereaf-
ter made a final determination that the petitioner was not entitled to relief.
In making that determination, the court satisfied the definition of "adjudi-
cation. " Indeed, recent cases suggest that any order will satisfy this defini-
tion."
In deciding that Carter's claim was "adjudicated," the court nonetheless
expressed concern about the action of the state MAR court.41 The court
rejected the claim that the amount of time spent reviewing a state habeas
petition is relevant to a determination of whether the court adjudicated the
claim, but stated: "We simply take this opportunity to express our hope, as
a federal court with limited powers of review, that state courts will give
34. Carter, 1999 WL 1267353, at *4 (quoting 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) (1999)); see Green v.
French, 143 F.3d 865, 868-76 (4th Cir. 1998) (discussing application of S 2254(d)(1)), cert.
denied 119 S. Ct. 944 (1999).
35. 152 F.3d 331 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 587 (1998).
36. Cardwell v. Green, 152 F.3d 331 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 587 (1998).
37. Id.
38. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia's order read as follows:
Applying the rule in Slaton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974), to
petitioner's allegation III and finding no merit in other complaints raised by
petitioner, the Court is of the opinion that the writ of habeas corpus should not
issue as prayed for. It is therefore ordered that the said petition be dismissed.
Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 146 (Va. 1994).
39. Id. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 42 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "adjudication"
as "[t]he formal giving or pronouncing a judgment or decree in a court proceeding").
40. See, e.g., Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 156-57 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that the
state court's dismissal of petitioner's habeas petition in a single paragraph order without a
hearing amounted to an adjudication on the merits).
41. Carter, 1999 WL 1267353, at *3-5.
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habeas petitions, particularly those in capital cases, careful and searching
consideration."42
B. Standby Counsel
This case highlights the need for standby counsel to be prepared to take
over the case at any time, and at a moment's notice. When Carter accepted
appointed counsel for the sentencing phase of his retrial, his attorneys
needed to be prepared effectively to present his case in mitigation. Instead,
Borgman's testimony during this phase completely destroyed the mitigation
case. 3 Borgman surely lost credibility with the jury when he was forced to
modify his opinion during cross examination. Additionally, the fact that he
was unaware that Carter had already pleaded guilty to a rape that occurred
on the same night that Borgman concluded he was incapable of engaging in
vaginal intercourse evidenced a critical lack of communication between the
expert and the defense team.
When attorneys are appointed to be standby counsel, they need to be
prepared to step in when and if the defendant decides to exercise his right
to assistance of counsel. This preparation may include talking with the
defendant about his case, including preparation of witnesses and his strate-
gies; advising the defendant about the difficulties inherent in pro se litiga-
tion; and working with the witnesses." Because defense counsel may be
forced to rectify problems of the defendant's own making (such as Carter's
failure fully to prepare Dr. Borgman), being standby counsel may require
more preparation than does simply being ordinary defense counsel.
C. Procedural Default
Carter offers another example of the harshness of the procedural default
rules.4" The Fourth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court that
42. Id.
43. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
44. Obviously, the best thing for the defendant is likely to be to accept appointed
counsel and not proceed pro se. In order to ensure that a client does not decline representa-
tion or seek to represent himself, it is important to develop a good relationship with the
client as early as possible. Some general rules for developing a relationship of confidence and
trust with a client include the following: (1) frequent visitation with the client, sometimes
not even talking about the case; (2) keeping the client informed and involved in the prepara-
tion of the defense; and (3) sometimes doing personal services for the incarcerated client, such
as carrying messages to family members. See Douglas R. Banghart, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF.
J. 117, 120 (1998) (analyzing King v. Greene, No. 97-28, 1998 WL 183909 (4th Cir. 1998)).
45. See e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1954 (1999) (holding that even though
petitioner established cause to excuse procedural default of his Brady motion, he was unable
to show prejudice to excuse the default). In Strickler, the court found that the materials in
question were clearly favorable to the petitioner for purposes of Brady and also that the
materials were known to the Commonwealth but not disclosed to defense counsel. Strickler,
[Vol. 12:2
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Carter's four claims of prosecutorial misconduct were defaulted because
they were not raised on direct appeal.' Carter argued that, although he
defaulted the claims by failing to raise them on appeal, he established cause
to excuse the default by showing that his counsel were constitutionally
ineffective in failing to raise the claims on appeal.47
In rejecting his argument, and finding that his counsel were not ineffec-
tive, the court stated explicitly that "[c]ounsel is not required to raise every
colorable claim on appeal."41 In light of the harsh procedural default scheme
currently in place, adherence to this statement poses a huge risk to the
criminal defendant: if the issues are not properly raised on appeal, they are
lost forever. Recently the United States Supreme Court highlighted the
importance of preserving claims on appeal in Weeks v. Angelone.4
In Weeks, the United States Supreme Court found that the trial judge's
direction of juror attention to a specific paragraph in the jury instruction
was an adequate response to the jury's request to clarify the instruction. s
In his appeal, petitioner argued that this response was erroneous. However,
the Court was not persuaded that petitioner truly viewed the response as a
flaw at the time of trial."' The Court's analysis on this point centered upon
the fact that petitioner neither mentioned this claim in his original motion
to set aside the sentence, nor briefed the claim near the beginning of his
appellate brief.5"
After Weeks, it is clear that the assignment of error on appeal is a
formidable undertaking. Not only must counsel carefully frame each
objection narrowly and broadly, using the same arguments advanced in
earlier proceedings, but the order of issues in the appellate brief now appears
to matter." Counsel should consider placing the strongest claims first in the
appellate brief.' At the top of the brief, counsel could note that the claims
119 S. Ct. at 1952.
46. Carter, 1999 WL 1267353, at *10.
47. Id.
48. Id., at *11.
49. 120 S. Ct. 727, 734 (2000) (suggesting that the claim before the Court was of low
priority for the defendant as it was the forty-fourth claim of forty-seven assigned in the
appellate brief); see Heather L. Necklaus, Case Note, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 387 (2000) (analyzing
Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 727 (2000)).
50. Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 727, 734 (2000).
51. Id.
52. Id. In the official opinion Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: "And the low priority
and space which his counsel assigned to the point on his appeal to the Supreme Court of
Virginia suggests that the present emphasis has some of the earmarks of an afterthought." Id.
53. Under Rule 5:17 all claims must be assigned and briefed within the fifty page limit
established by Rule 5:26. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:17; VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:26.
54. This practice is suggested instead of listing the claims in chronological order.
2000] 433
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are not in chronological order, but listed according to the strength of the
claim."
Ashley Flynn
55. Arranging the brief in this manner is an attempt to avoid a meritorious claim being
rejected as an "afterthought" because it appears late in the brief. See supra note 52.
